Abstract: This essay explores the strategic implications that the fight against piracy off Somalia has for the international commu nity. After giving a summary of what maritime security is, the essay explores how to deal with the threat, surveys the actors, and looks into who can and who is willing to act, and how. Using the case of Somalia as an example, it sketches the realities of 21st century international power relations and outlines the emerging hazards to the global system's stability. The article also addresses the issue of whether piracy and maritime terrorism should be considered as two sides of one coin, or merely two completely sepa rate issues for security policymakers.
Introduction Introduction
I f a future historian were to collect newspaper articles of re cent naval engagements off Somalia, an impression could emerge that, back in the year 2009, East African waters were teeming with naval vessels under all flags, attempting to combat the piracy threat. "Well," he or she might conclude, "this was truly a glimpse of multipolarity par excellence." In deed, little has been said so far about the strategic implications for the world community that go beyond the rapid deployment of naval vessels to the theater.
Maritime security, henceforth understood as the security and safety of maritime shipping lanes and all the vessels us ing them, is at stake. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that maritime security also touches upon the issues related to coastlines and territorial waters that each govern ment is exclusively permitted to control by jurisdiction. Fur thermore, it includes harbors, oil rigs, widespanning bridges, tunnels, and even transoceanic cables -most of which are less relevant in the case of Somalia. Here, the challenge is banditry against the sea lines of communication (SLOC) that pass by the Horn of Africa (HOA), inhibiting freedom of navigation and threatening regional security and economic interests. The area around the HOA, the outlet of the Suez Canal, is one of the world's major choke points. These are characterized as being particularly prone to threats such as collisions, regional po litical instability and piracy while acting as parts of the world's international maritime trade routes (Donna J. Nincic 2002: 146) . Maritime piracy is understood as an attack mounted for private ends on a ship, involving violence, illegal detention of persons or property, or the theft or destruction of goods that is directed on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state, according to the United Nations Convention on the High Seas (1958) and the Convention of the Law of the Sea (1982) (Nincic 2002: 159) . Others define it as any illegal act of violence, detention, or depredation committed outside terri torial waters for private rather than political ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship, persons, or crew (James Kraska/Brian Wilson 2008: not paged). The situation on the HOA, where some 16,000 to 21,000 ships pass by on the EuropeAsia route each year, reflects some crucial realities of the international system so vividly that it is worth taking a closer look.
The world sets sail for the Horn of Africa
Despite the dramatic images broadcast on various news net works, the troubled waters of the HOA are not exactly crowd ed with warships. According to internal Bundeswehr sources quoted in several German newspapers, up to 500 vessels will be needed to effectively patrol the area in question. At the same time, this number seems highly overrated given that the same source also limits the number of German military personnel to 1,400 soldiers (DER SPIEGEL Online, 26 November 2008) ; this is one of the more prominent examples of the discrepancy between means and ends in German military foreign policy. At the same time, domestic politics present a major drawback for effective policymaking. Some fear a creeping backdoor legiti mization of the use of the Bundeswehr for policing duties, which is highly contested in Germany and in part to be explained by Germany's history. This issue as well as an inherent struggle for competence between the ministries involved forms the back ground to the German naval engagement. Some also hold this -and the lack of a LHD amphibious assault vessel -responsi ble for the failure of German GSG9 Special Forces to free the German ship Hansa Stavanger from the hands of pirates (May 2009). In any case, the theater is large, and given the complex ity of the problem, far more vessels need to be dispatched to ef fectively combat the threat. This is not just limited to Germany, but needs to be a concern to all powers involved. The current situation is, in the words of a spokesperson from the Verband Deutscher Reeder (German ship owners association) quoted in the German weekly DIE ZEIT No. 24/2009, "like putting one single policeman into thirteen European capitals at once".
Indeed, a number of actors have set out to fight piracy in this region. Their first order of business: securing the SLOC so that trade between Europe and Asia can once again pass freely and uninhibitedly through the Gulf of Aden (the outlet of the Red Sea and Suez Canal), the waters separating Yemen from Soma lia, as well as the high seas off the East coast of the African con tinent. A dramatic increase in recent attacks on and seizures of merchant ships, most notably the 332 m, 318,000 metric tons MV Sirius Star on November 15, 2008, has upset the interna tional community. Fortunately enough, this public relations stunt came to a peaceful end as ransom was paid and the pirates allowed the ship to sail on.
Along with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), powers such as Russia, India, and even China have dispatched vessels to the area. In a rare oc currence, all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are working in concert. According to some, these are the only other countries with the economic poten tial to build navies capable of blue water operations far from their homelands (Dennis Blair/ Kenneth Lieberthal 2007: 11) , but this view is highly contentious, as the ranking of navies is usually a rather tricky exercise, and lesser seapowers such as Malaysia have also sent vessel(s). There is certainly no doubt that the rising threat of piracy in international waters has trig gered activism by concerned countries and brought out new naval players (Brian Wilson/James Kraska 2009: not paged).
The longstanding deployment of the U.S.led Combined Task Force 150 in the socalled Global War on Terror already pro vided some initial naval presence in the area, albeit it geared towards the different objective of counterterrorism (Michael Stehr 2009: 6) . Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) Security Council has gone to extraordinary lengths in condemning the situation in Somalia and urging member states to act quickly (cf. Security Council Resolution 1814 ), 1816 ), 1838 ), 1844 ), and 1846 ). The message is clear: The world will take measures to safeguard its vital shipping. How ever, if there are any lessons learned from past engagements, any military solution must inevitably be linked to a stronger political solution. The United Nations in general and the U.S. & the West in particular have a history of illfated missions in Somalia, which does not improve the chances for a quick and sustainable solution.
A unique challenge: Somalia
Without a doubt, piracy continues to be a problem elsewhere in the world as well. Two of the significant areas are the West Coast of Africa -largely unnoticed due to the fact that international trade routes are hardly affected -and the Strait of Malacca, where piracy has decreased in recent years, largely due to the establishment of an effective coast guard by the littoral states. Some also attribute this development to the fallout of the Box ing Day Tsunami in 2004. In general, bottlenecks, or narrow straits where maritime traffic has to slow down to avoid shallow banks, deal with increased shipping and maneuver carefully are susceptible to seaborne assaults. Two of these major bot tlenecks are the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden. The situation off Somalia's coast is notable for the international community because a large fraction of trade between Europe and Asia passes through the now pirateinfested waters off the HOA.
In Somalia, the international community is dealing with a fail ing (if not failed) state without any sustainable form of cen tralized government. This is not necessarily a new or unique phenomenon, since Somalia has been without proper govern mental authority since 1991, the year of Siad Barre regime's fall. It is important to note the failure of any Somali authorities to provide and maintain adequate coast guard and maritime pro tection services, and their inability to provide sufficient incen tives to dissuade locals from seeking their fortunes in piracy. This is to be taken quite literally, as the estimated per capita GDP of roughly $600 is easily trumped by piracy profits. Broadly speaking, Somali piracy sheds light on the political and humanitarian grievances that the people in this fractured country have to endure -famine, absence of rule of law, vio lence, overfishing of their waters and the illegal dumping of toxic garbage into Somali territorial waters by foreign powers who take advantage of this failing state. All these issues provide an inexpensive selfjustification for the bandits.
Whatever the cause, the piracy threat has a massive impact on the global economy. While the immediate economic fallout is certainly manageable, the psychological shock for producers and consumers alike is notable. A regional nuisance is turning into a global problem. Before military means were increasingly dispatched, technical measures drew most of the public atten tion. This is in part to be explained by the absence of large crews on larger modern cargo vessels, and the resulting inability (or in some cases unwillingness) to man sufficient antipiracy watch on deck at all times. Cameras on deck, barbed wire, highpres sure water and sound canons, and even the application of soft soap on the planks were discussed as technical countermeas ures. All of these ideas may be good when taken for themselves, but the practical effect and implementation can be questioned. At that point, mercenary companies such as Blackwater (re cently renamed "Xe") offered their help, providing expensive onboard security for the passage along the HOA and even con voy service with their very own vessel. Piracy, thus, clearly fuels a whole industry that profits from providing security.
Some shipping companies such as the Danish Maersk Line in November 2008 decided to divert their shipping around the West Coast of Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. But this pas sage does not provide full security from acts of piracy either, it is prone to strong weather, prolongs the journey and thus raises the costs at the expense of the consumers. It serves as a textbook example of how fragile and interdependent the global "just in time" economy of today is. The coming into common use of the highly efficient cargo container, which can swiftly be moved from ship to train or truck, has led to this economi cal commercial practice of resupply of goods or products from source to store. Not many people wish to disrupt this efficient flow (Frank Uhlig 2003: 48) . Meanwhile, insurance premiums for international traffic along the bottleneck of the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the HOA rose.
Maritime terrorism is functionally different from maritime piracy. Pirates seek economic gain; terrorists seek political or social advantage. Pirates did not display the martyr attitude in their assaults that is so common to terrorism. Meanwhile, it is safe to say that transnational terrorist networks such as al Qaida are closely monitoring the impact that piracy has on the global economy. They may intend to use it for their own advantage or their next major strike (Middleton 2008: 10) . In the post9/11 world, three forms of maritime terrorism are of particular concern: an attack on a large individual ship carry ing hazardous goods or a cruise ship; the hijacking of any such ship; and the use of a ship as a weapon to attack port or land facilities. In light of the missing link between the bandits and transnational terrorist networks, and some clear differences between maritime piracy and maritime terrorism, the actual strength of the piracyterrorism nexus is contested (Peter Chalk 2008: 3135) . At the same time, the USS Cole bombing in 2000 and the attack against the MV Limbourg in 2002 suggest that a "9/11 at sea" -for example, an attack on a large tanker or, worse, its use as a weapon against other targets -is conceivable (Rolf Tophoven 2008: 24) . It is also for this reason that we should be most concerned about how to deal with the issues at hand.
Those, such as the former CommanderinChief of U.S. Pacific Command, Dennis Blair and the political scientist Kenneth Lieberthal, who saw maritime insecurity simply as an issue of brown or bluewater navies illegitimately using their power to disrupt international oil shipping, were overly optimistic. They claimed that tankers are floating fortresses, virtually unsinkable by the weaponry of insurgents, and that maritime terrorism was merely limited to hitandrun robbery (Blair/Lieberthal 2007: 811) . Scenarios that take into consideration maritime terrorism in any form mentioned in the paragraph above (e.g. the explosion of a liquidgas tanker in a major port or choke point) seriously speak to the point that the threat is indeed much more complex, and much more difficult to constrain.
Aside from the floating weapon hazard, the threat to the envi ronment by a leaking tanker or large vessel has repeatedly been stressed. Should a container ship be fatally damaged at sea, not only would the ship's cargo be lost but hundreds of buoyant or semibuoyant containers could break looks and form a large floating minefield, endangering all ships and craft nearby, per haps for months (Uhlig 2003: 49) . This is especially important as pirates become bolder and use ever more powerful weaponry that could set fire to, sink or force ashore a tanker or any other larger cargo vessel. The environmental catastrophe would be devastating for marine and avian life for years to come (Mid dleton 2008: 9), especially given the lessdeveloped counter measures in this part of the world that could be applied (as has been the case in major oil spills in Europe or the U. S.). It is safe to assume that while the Somali pirates have no immedi ate interest in ruining their own fishing grounds by the means of such an action, a frustrated assault on a large vessel with the objective of sinking it and causing a major oil spill can not be ruled out.
Looking for distinctive and sustainable solutions
Interests in preserving and defending maritime security form the backdrop of understanding why this matters to the inter national community. The response of said global community embodies which actors can effectively combat what they per ceive as a major disturbance of global trade. Bluntly speaking, it shows who can and who is willing to act. It also reflects who has an interest in maritime security in this part of the world (and beyond). In such a situation where the problem of failing states, asymmetric warfare, and an issue of global concern coincide, these pirates are causing considerable problems -not just for those directly affected and for naval fleets of major powers in terms of rules of engagement, but also for the governments in places like Berlin or Washington in terms of politicomilitary responses.
The outgoing George W. Bush administration identified some wideranging policy objectives, namely prevention of attacks; deterrence through constabulary forces; reduction of the mari time domain's vulnerability through technical measures; hold ing pirates accountable for their crime; preservation of freedom of the seas; protection of SLOCs; and finally leadership and sup port of international efforts. A central tool is the Global Mari time Partnership (dubbed "1,000shipnavy"), a key concept identified in the latest U.S. Maritime Strategy (Navy.mil 2007: not paged). There is no reason to believe why President Barack Obama will digress from his predecessor's policy decisions on this issue, given the fact that Robert Gates continues to lead the Pentagon and given that the problem will stay on the security policy agenda. If anything, Obama will seek a more compre hensive, alliancebased naval approach while retaining U.S. leadership, the latter of which at least implicitly. As Gary Weir has noted, the situation off the HOA may even open the door towards a quicker realization of a global maritime partnership (Gary Weir 2009: 25) .
The European Union, often denounced as a paper tiger, was quick to stand up with EU NAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta), sending six warships and a number of reconnaissance planes. This is Europe's chance to give something back to in ternational security. It may not close the capability gap, but it develops confidence and credibility -despite an ongoing strug gle between operational and intellectual ideas. The EU, with its diverse and difficult security policy decision making process, will not consider their Atalanta mission an end itself. Atalanta Simultaneously, some of CTF 150's roughly fifteen ships have been involved in deterring pirate attacks (Middleton 2008: 8) . With Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), established on January 8, 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) specifi cally addressed the complex and confusing legal restrictions of member states, having led to some limitations of CTF 150's antipiracy efforts (Navy.mil, 8 January 2009: not paged). For the United States of America, the rising activity of pirates repre sents a threat to life, property, and free navigation of the sea at the southern end of an area that is of great concern to the U.S. Navy Central Command and CTF 150 anyhow (Weir 2009: 22) . It did not come as a surprise that the U.S. 5th Fleet is now even more so involved in antipiracy patrols. India's Navy has also taken a greater effort in combating piracy off Somalia, and so have SaudiArabia and Malaysia. Russia was quick to send one of its frigates after, on September 25, 2008, the Ukrainian MV Faina (152 m and 13,870 metric tons) was taken over by pirates. A little later, it was revealed that Faina was carrying 33 T72 tanks, rocketpropelled grenades, antiaircraft guns and a host of other weapons. The vessel was finally released for ransom in January 2009. Even China, in a rare foreign policy move, dis patched naval vessels to HOA (CNN.com, 17 December 2008: not paged) to safeguard Chinese shipping interests. Likewise, the Iranian Navy has dispatched vessels in order to secure and defend the region's vital sealanes. All of these moves have to be considered as ambitious quests for political and economic influ ence in the area and beyond. They are expressions of interests of states and should be seen against the backdrop of largescale maritime and naval armament programs already underway in many of those countries discussed.
B E I T R Ä G E A U S S I C H E R H E I T S P O L I T I K | Bruns, Multipolarity Under the Magnifying-Glass U N D F R I E D E N S F O R S C H U N G
Never before has such a diverse armada with so many different objectives come together to fight what they perceive as a com mon threat. At the same time, it is quite apparent that tested means of naval commitment -rules of engagement, interoper ability, equipment, and tactics -may not suffice in the face of the new situation. It is a strategic imperative to find suitable solutions on how to deal with the issue. At this time, it seems that the international community's response leaves more ques tions open than it answers.
• Jurisdiction: In our time of globalization, which jurisdic tion applies when a German cargo freighter under a flag of convenience, with a nonEuropean, multinational crew, is attacked and/or seized? Delicate jurisdictional issues arise which must be carefully balanced.
• Status of Arrestees: In the case of Germany, those arrested would have to be transferred to Hamburg where the respon sible court is located; any given jail time would have to be in Germany or in likeminded countries, as Germany (or the EU, for that matter) does not extradite prisoners to a country like Somalia where possible torture awaits prisoners. So, what is the status of pirates who have been captured, and how can states or alliances come to a pragmatic yet humanitarian so lution? Should there be a UN or EU tribunal? The arrange ment between the EU and Kenya to try suspects is a first step in the right direction, after unclear jurisdiction lead to the need to let suspected pirates go prior to this agreement.
• Traces of Multilateral Action: Can states or alliances, on short notice, come to terms with how to deal with a specific mari time issue? There is no unified command for all ships or na tions combating piracy. Should one be established? Can one be established, given the underlying rivalry of powers and the huge area of operation, where it remains complicated to achieve complete situational awareness? The "Maritime Security Centre" currently located in Northwood (near Lon don, England) may be a first step. Still, the efficiency of the parallel operations has repeatedly been questioned. For this reason, the outgoing NATO SecretaryGeneral Jan de Hoop Schaeffer, recently spoke out in favor of a formalized coop eration between NATO and the Russian Navy.
• Equipment: Are weaponry sufficient and tactics applicable, as a number of large warships confront small speedboats, concealed in mother ships?
• DoItYourselfApproach: Can the proactive measures un dertaken by ship owners and crews (water cannons, high travel speeds, tripwires, deck guards, barbed wire, high pitch sound cannons, and mercenaries) really do the trick? What can, what must be expected from the commercial vessel op erators?
• Window of Opportunity: The pirates' method of operation leaves only a marginal window of opportunity for a military interception, which could only come from a surface vessel close to the scene or an aircraft. What is the best means to combat the threat? Maritime Patrol Aircraft, fast military ves sels, or a combination of both?
• Blast from the past: Will we see a return to expensive and timeconsuming maritime convoys, such as during World War II or the "Tanker War" in the Persian Gulf of the late 1980's, or will pragmatic "group transits" prevail?
• "End date" vs. "End state": Most current missions have set timelimits (e.g. EU NAVFOR Somalia is set to be relieved in December 2009). But what exactly is the end state that is to be achieved? On the same token: What are effective exit plans?
These are questions that cannot be answered easily. It is im perative that a coherent modus operandi will be found. In the stricter sense, pragmatic and applicable solutions must be found quickly. Shuffling off responsibility is no longer an op tion (Stehr 2009: 6 When a multilateral response came into being in earlier con flicts such as the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, long periods of time and agony passed before an emerging multipolar world would react; usually under U.S. leadership. In contrast, there has been a dramatic change today. The urgency of the problem is note worthy, as is the projected response, which is mostly limited to maritime countermeasures in favor of a sustainable politi cal solution for Somalia itself. It is rather unlikely that the U.S. will take unilateral action in tackling this issue. Despite the fact that the UN has mandated pursuing pirates on land, and albeit CTF151 contains amphibious landing ships, largescale freeing of hostages or direct attacks against pirate shelters have not yet taken place. In any case, naval action alone will not solve the problem, nor can navies be the sole solution (although, on an average day for the United States' 5th Fleet used as an example here, there are some 23,000 U.S. sailors stationed in the region, either at sea or at shore facilities).
Africa is just becoming a greater concern to NATO, the EU, and the United States. President Obama, having paternal roots in Kenya (a country bordering Somalia), will put more emphasis on a "New Deal" for Africa. As part of this possible initiative, the newly installed AFRICAN COMMAND (AFRICOM) could be highlighted as a resource for those combating the piracy threat (McNeill 2008: 2) .
In conclusion, as we survey the actors, it seems that most ma jor naval powers are both: willing and able to act. It is clear that swift action needs to be taken to combat the emerging threats. However, the actors greatly differ in the robustness of their rules of engagement: those of the U.S. being robust, and those of the EU geared more towards deterrence. They differ in their experience in conducting such missions: For the EU, this is their first naval outofarea mission, whereas China is just beginning to act as naval power as well. The U.S., on the other hand, has a rich experience as a naval power. They contrast in their approach to bureaucracy: Germany's somewhat reluctant style or American and French pragmatism. They differ in their determination to combat the threat effectively. They differ in their leadership aspirations (for the U.S.); and their general sense of seriousness in combating piracy (for Russia or India). There are also substantial differences in the allocation of funds and military spending. These diverging approaches and the various national interests do not reflect the level of efficiency that could be achieved. There is a looming danger of a "beauty contest" between EU, NATO and the task forces about which naval vessel will fight under which command. This holds true for both alliance and nonalliance members. It is essential for states and alliances to cooperate and coordinate. Currently, it appears that resources are potentially wasted by duplication of functions, and the inhibition of flow of information, of lessons learned and of best practices (Kimberley Thachuk/Sam Tan gredi 2002: 58) . This is especially crucial as pirates move now farther away from the Somali coast and extend their radius of operation deep into the Indian Ocean. Some of the more recent attempts to seize vessels occurred more than 600 nautical miles
